JAMES WARE, District Judge.
Jaqueline Fleming ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Gordon & Wong Law Group, P.C. ("Defendant"), alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., violation of the Rosenthal Act ("RFDCPA"), Cal. Civ.Code § 1788 et seq., and invasion of privacy. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated federal and state laws by attempting to collect a debt of $1869.00 resulting from a state court Writ of Execution.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (hereafter, "Motion," Docket Item No. 12.) The Court conducted a hearing on July 12, 2010. (See Docket Item No. 20.) Based on the papers submitted to date and oral argument, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DISMISSES the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On December 31, 1998, a judgment of $2447.41 was entered against Plaintiff in a Santa Clara County Superior Court Case
On September 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (hereafter, "Complaint," Docket Item No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: (1) Violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; (2) Violation of the RFDCPA, Cal. Civ.Code § 1788 et seq.; and (3) Invasion of Privacy.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Based upon the materials filed, the Court construes the Motion as a request to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Court applies the standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). On a facial challenge, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362; Thornhill Publishing Co. v.
Defendant moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action on two grounds: (1) Plaintiffs FDCPA and RFDCPA claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) Defendant falls within a statutory exclusion of the RFDCPA. (Motion at 1.) The Court addresses the Rooker-Feldman issue first since it may be dispositive.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Instead, the proper court in which to obtain such review is the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not only review of decisions of the state's highest court, but also those of its lower courts. See Dubinka v. Judges of Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir.1994). "The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack." Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001). A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir.1998).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be construed narrowly and is limited to situations where a plaintiff alleges a de-facto appeal by both asserting errors by the state court and seeking relief from the state court judgment as a remedy. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2004). However, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that Rooker-Feldman may be applicable even where a plaintiff does not directly contest the merits of a state court decision. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir.2008). A court must examine whether the federal causes of action are "`inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such that adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules. . . ." Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859; see Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.2003).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA
The Court finds that Plaintiffs FDCPA claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs alleged injury is based on her contention that only $149.98 remained due to Defendant when Defendant filed the December 2008 Application seeking $1869.00. (See Opposition at 10-13.) To evaluate Plaintiffs claim, the Court must determine the validity of the $1869.00 debt recognized by the state court in the May 2009 Writ of Execution. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Thus, adjudication of Plaintiffs FDCPA claim would undercut the state court's judgment and constitute a de-facto appeal. See Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859.
Plaintiff contends she is seeking actual and statutory damages under the FDCPA that is independent of the $1869.00 debt recognized in the May 2009 Writ of Execution. (Opposition at 5, 7.) Plaintiff relies on Exxon for the proposition that her claim is not barred simply because in addressing it, the Court may "deny a legal conclusion that [the] state court has reached." Id.; see Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 289, 125 S.Ct. 1517. The Court finds that Plaintiffs contention is unavailing because there is no question that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district court from reviewing an FDCPA claim that challenges the validity of a debt authorized by a state court judgment.
The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DISMISSES this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Clerk of Court shall close this file.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows the Court to take judicial notice of a fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is ... capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed.R.Evid. 201. Here, the state court documents are public court records whose accuracy is easily verifiable. Furthermore, neither party has opposed any request for judicial notice of these documents. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the parties' requests for judicial notice of the state court documents.